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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
E. Marvin Herr, a land developer, appeals the grant of 
summary judgment to Pequea Township ("Township") and 
its three supervisors, Virginia Brady, Bruce Groff, and 
Martin Hughes (collectively, "defendants"), in this civil 
rights action. Herr alleges that his right to substantive due 
process was violated by an eleven year campaign of the 
Township and its officers to delay and obstruct his 
development of an industrial park. 
 
The defendants adopted a land use plan and a sewer 
facilities plan based in part on their view that industrial 
development within the Township should be restricted. 
Over the next eleven years, Herr, who wished to construct 
an industrial park and who had applied to the Lancaster 
County Planning Commission ("LCPC") for approval of a 
subdivision plan prior to the effective date of these plans, 
sought the necessary authorization for his development 
from the LCPC, the Department of Environmental Review 
("DER"), the Environmental Hearing Board ("EHB"), the 
Zoning Hearing Board ("ZHB"), and the courts. The 
Township participated in the proceedings before each of 
these bodies. While it acknowledged that Herr's project was 
grandfathered under the prior land use plan if he 
completed it within five years, the Township insisted that 
he had no vested right to municipal sewer services under 
the prior sewer facilities plan and argued that the 
Township's new plan should be enforced. After Herr 
secured an order from the DER directing the Township to 
amend its sewer facilities plan so as to provide municipal 
sewer service to his property and obtained a land use 
permit from the LCPC, the Township took the position in 
further proceedings that not all conditions of the LCPC's 
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approval had been fulfilled and that the five year 
grandfathering had expired before completion of the project. 
Ultimately, Herr secured the necessary authority to go 
forward with his industrial park. 
 
Herr claims that the defendants' conduct with respect to 
his proposed development was motivated throughout by a 
strong desire to preserve agricultural land and restrain 
development in the Township. In support of this claim, he 
has tendered evidence tending to show that the individual 
defendants had run for office on "anti-development" 
platforms and that their adoption of a new zoning 
ordinance and sewer facilities plan was intended to make it 
more difficult for developers to secure approvals of their 
projects. Herr stresses, for example, that the new zoning 
ordinance reduced the land zoned industrial by 68 percent. 
 
While Herr points to the defendants' adoption of the new 
zoning ordinance and sewer plan as evidence of their"anti- 
development bias," we do not understand him to contend 
that the defendants' actions with respect to those plans 
violated his right to substantive due process. Decisions on 
whether to adopt or amend zoning ordinances and 
municipal services plans are legislative ones that must 
survive due process review unless "the governmental body 
could have had no legitimate reason for its decisions." Pace 
Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 
1034 (3d Cir. 1987). The desire to limit development is such 
a legitimate reason. Id. 
 
Rather, Herr claims that the defendants conspired to 
prevent him from securing the necessary approvals from 
other government agencies, or to delay the receipt of those 
approvals until his project would no longer be 
grandfathered under the prior ordinance. In support of this 
contention, he submitted what he regards as a "smoking 
gun" letter from Dr. Alan Peterson, the Chairman of the 
Pequea Township Environmental Advisory Council, to the 
Township's legal counsel dated February 19, 1994. That 
letter states in part: 
 
       Only Virginia Brady and I in the township know the 
       following: (Do not state this back to the township in 
       any manner). The owner must sell the lots, then all 
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       land development plans must be approved by 10/94 or 
       they become nonconforming lots in the Ag. District. 
       Obviously the longer we can stall (if we can't win this 
       with the [Department of Environmental Review]), the 
       better. 
 
App. at 374-75. 
 
According to Herr, the defendants' conspiracy consisted 
of (1) resisting before the LCPC, the DER, the Board, and 
the courts Herr's efforts to secure the right to proceed; (2) 
instructing its own personnel to carefully scrutinize Herr's 
proposal in order to identify any possible problems; and (3) 
communicating with the LCPC, the DER, the State Fish 
Commission, the State Game Commission, and other 
governmental agencies voicing various concerns about the 
proposed project. 
 
Herr relies on a line of our cases which hold that a 
township or other agency acting under color of state law 
denies a landowner substantive due process if it denies or 
delays action on his permit application for reasons 
unrelated to the merits of the application. See Woodwind 
Estates, Ltd. v. Gretkowski, 205 F.3d 118, 124-25 (3d Cir. 
2000) (holding that delay of permitting process because of 
community resistance to proposed low income housing 
project provided jury with a basis from which it could 
reasonably find that decision maker acted in bad faith or 
due to an improper motive violating developer's substantive 
due process rights); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
53 F.3d 592, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that denial of 
permit based on decision maker's personal financial 
interest, if proven, establishes a violation of the right to be 
free from arbitrary and capricious government action); 
Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 
267-68 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that conspiracy to delay 
permits for industrial park for political reasons unrelated to 
the merits of an application is sufficient to establish a 
substantive due process violation); Parkway Garage, Inc. v. 
City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 696-97 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the jury could reasonably infer improper 
motive when lease was allegedly terminated based upon 
decision maker's economic interest); Bello v. Walker, 840 
F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a 
 
                                4 
 
 
municipal corporation's denial of a building permit for 
partisan political or personal reasons unrelated to the 
merits of the case, if proven, establishes a substantive due 
process violation). Herr correctly points out that, while the 
ultimate issue before the LCPC and the other governmental 
bodies was whether to permit a new industrial park, 
resolution of that issue properly turned on whether his 
development met the criteria established by law. The 
defendants' opposition, according to Herr, was motivated by 
a determination to stop his development without regard to 
whether it met those criteria. 
 
Unlike the defendants in the cases cited by Herr, 
however, the Township and its supervisors were not 
authorized to issue permits for Herr's industrial park. The 
LCPC alone had that authority. Herr's claim is thus not 
that the defendants subverted a decision making process 
by taking irrelevant considerations into account. It is rather 
that the defendants contested issues before the bodies 
authorized to resolve various permitting issues because 
they wished to defeat or delay the approval of Herr's project 
by those bodies. This claim is materially different from the 
claims asserted in Bello and its progeny. 
 
We conclude that there is evidence from which a trier of 
fact could conclude that the Township's challenged conduct 
was motivated by a desire to stop Herr's development. At 
the same time, we conclude that there is no evidence from 
which a trier of fact could conclude that the Township took 
frivolous positions or otherwise unreasonably delayed the 
proceedings before the various state bodies. We hold that 
where a township participates in proceedings before other 
governmental agencies authorized to resolve issues like 
those here presented, the township and its supervisors are 
not subject to liability for delay occasioned by those 
proceedings solely because their participation was 
motivated by a desire to delay or prevent the project for 
which approval is sought.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The dissent correctly notes that the Township and its supervisors have 
asked us to affirm the judgment of the District Court on the ground that 
the evidence presents no material dispute of fact as to whether they had 
an improper motive. If Bello and its progeny were the controlling 
 





Herr sought to develop approximately 45 acres of land 
that he owns in Pequea Township, Lancaster County, 
Pennsylvania. By October 9, 1989, he learned of a proposed 
land use plan under which the zoning of his land would be 
changed so as to permit only agricultural use. On 
December 5, 1989, Herr submitted to the LCPC a 
subdivision plan to construct an industrial park on this 
property ("Millwood Industrial Park" or "Millwood"). At the 
time he submitted this plan, his property was zoned 
industrial, and the existing sewage facilities plan ("the 1971 
sewage facilities plan") was a county-wide plan providing 
public sewers pursuant to the Pennsylvania Sewage 
Facilities Act ("Act 537"). The LCPC considered and rejected 
the industrial park plan twice, and Herr resubmitted it 
twice. Ultimately, the LCPC granted preliminary conditional 
approval on October 9, 1990, and preliminary 
unconditional approval on February 25, 1991. 
 
After Herr's subdivision plan was filed but several 
months before the LCPC approvals, Pequea Township, on 
August 22, 1990, adopted a new Township map to conform 
with Lancaster County's comprehensive plan. On the new 
map, the land where Herr's proposed industrial park was to 
be situated was rezoned from industrial to agricultural. 
Under Pennsylvania law, Herr was allowed five years from 
the date of the preliminary approval to complete his non- 
conforming development.2 Following adoption of the new 
zoning, the Township began to revise its sewage facilities 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
authority here and motive were the legally relevant issue, we would find 
ourselves hard pressed to uphold the District Court's judgment. 
However, "when the judgment of a district court is [legally] correct, it 
may be affirmed for reasons not given by the Court and not advanced to 
it." Video International Production, Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable 
Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1085 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Laird 
v. Shell Oil Co., 770 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 1985)); Elliott Coal Mining 
Co. 
v. Director, 17 F.3d 616, 628 n. 16 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
2. Under Pennsylvania law, once a development proposal is submitted, 
the zoning regulations in place are not subject to change (with respect to 
that proposal) for five years after the preliminary proposal is approved. 
See 53 Pa. C.S.A. S 10508(4)(i). 
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plan to comport with its new land planning scheme. On 
June 3, 1992, the Township repealed prior sewage plans 
and adopted a new sewage plan. The new plan provided for 
the extension of public sewers into areas of the Township 
designated for development but not into areas designated 
for agricultural use. Accordingly, the permitted sewage 
disposal for the area in which Millwood was situated was 
changed from public sewers to on-lot disposal systems. As 
required, the Township submitted its sewage facilities plan 
to the DER for approval under Act 537. 
 
On July 30, 1992, Herr requested that the Township 
amend its sewage facilities plan so as to provide for 
municipal sewer service to Millwood. A little over a month 
later, on September 2, 1992, that request was denied.3 Herr 
then filed a "private request" with the DER under 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 750.5 seeking an order requiring the 
Township to amend its sewage plan as it had been 
requested to do.4 At the time of Herr's private request, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 71.53 of the DER regulations, as then in effect, provided: 
 
        (f) A municipality may refuse to adopt a proposed revision to 
their 
       official plan for new land development for reasons, including, but 
       not limited to: 
 
        (1) The plan is not technically or administratively able to be 
       implemented. 
 
        (2) Present and future sewage disposal needs of the area, 
       remaining acreage or delineated lots are not adequately addressed. 
 
        (3) The plan is not consistent with municipal land use plans and 
       ordinances, subdivision ordinances or other ordinances or plans for 
       controlling land use or development. 
 
        (4) The plan is not consistent with the comprehensive sewage 
       program of the municipality as contained in the official plan. 
 
        (5) The plan does not meet the consistency requirements of 
       S 71.21(a)(5)(i)-(iii). 
 
25 Pa. Code S 71.53(f) (1989). 
 
4. Section 750.5(b), as then in effect, provided: 
 
        Any person who is a resident or property owner in a municipality 
       may request the department to order the municipality to revise its 
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Department was still reviewing the plan that the Township 
had submitted. 
 
On September 28, 1993, the LCPC gave conditional final 
approval to a final plan for Millwood that had been 
submitted on August 3, 1992 ("the August 1992 plan"). The 
approval was conditioned on Herr's satisfaction of over forty 
conditions including his securing approval for his proposed 
sewage disposal. On February 8, 1994, the DER granted 
Herr's private request and issued an order directing the 
Township to revise its 1992 sewage plan. 
 
Several years of litigation ensued. On March 25, 1994, 
the EHB reversed the decision of the DER. In response to 
this decision, the DER denied Herr's private request on 
April 4, 1994. Then Herr appealed, first to the EHB and 
next to the Commonwealth Court. On May 31, 1996, the 
Commonwealth Court reversed the EHB's decision, found in 
favor of Herr, and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. On remand, the EHB ultimately granted 
summary judgment on the sewage disposal issue. The 
Township and the DER both filed a petition for 
reconsideration with the Board, which denied the petition, 
and then a petition for review with the Commonwealth 
Court, which, on July 10, 1998, affirmed the Board's 
decision. Pequea Township v. Herr, 716 A.2d 678, 681 (Pa. 
Commonw. Ct. 1998). 
 
Throughout the "sewer litigation," the Township 
maintained that the law specifying the sewer requirements 
applicable to the Millwood site was the 1992 sewer plan. In 
support of this view, it took the position that (1) the 1992 
plan became effective without DER approval on October 20, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       official plan where said person can show that the official plan is 
       inadequate to meet the resident's or property owner's sewage 
       disposal needs. Such request may only be made after a prior 
       demand upon and refusal by the municipality to so revise its 
official 
       plan. The request to the department shall contain a description of 
       the area of the municipality in question and an enumeration of all 
       reasons advanced by said person to show the official plan's 
       inadequacy. Such person shall give notice to the municipality of 
the 
       request to the department. 
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1992, pursuant to 25 Pa. Code S 71.32(c) (1989),5 and the 
DER accordingly lacked authority for its original order; and 
(2) the statute grandfathering for five years developments 
pending approval at the time of a zoning change did not 
apply to sewer plans and, accordingly, Herr had no vested 
right to public sewer service. The Board agreed with the 
Township that the 1992 plan became effective on October 
20, 1992. The Commonwealth Court did not reach the 
merits of that issue but did agree with the Township that 
the grandfathering provision for zoning ordinances did not 
give Herr a right to public sewer services under the 1971 
plan. Pequea Township v. Herr, 716 A.2d 678, 684 (Pa. 
Commonw. Ct. 1998). The Court nevertheless decided in 
Herr's favor on the ground that, even if a landowner's 
proposal is inconsistent with the applicable municipal 
sewer plan, the DER is authorized to require its adoption 
upon a showing that the provisions of the municipal plan 
are "inadequate" to meet the needs of the landowner. The 
Commonwealth Court wrote at some length on each of the 
six contentions raised by the DER and the Township. 
 
On November 29, 1998, once all the sewage issues were 
settled, the LCPC determined that Herr met all of the 
remaining conditions for approval and permitted 
recordation of the final land development plan. The 
Township then appealed this decision to the Court of 
Common Pleas, arguing (1) that Herr failed to meet three of 
the other conditions imposed by the LCPC when it 
conditionally approved the August 1992 plan; and (2) that 
Herr's vested rights to application of the pre-existing zoning 
ordinance had expired because five years had elapsed since 
the approval of his preliminary development plan and no 
valid extension had been granted by the LCPC. 
 
Meanwhile, after recordation, Herr began construction of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This section provides: 
 
       Upon the Department's failure to act on a complete official plan or 
       revision within 120 days of its submission, the official plan or 
       official plan revision will be considered approved, unless the 
       Department informs the municipality prior to the end of 120 days 
       that additional time is necessary to complete its review. The 
       additional time may not exceed 60 days. 
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his industrial park. During construction, Herr erected a 
sign advertising the sale of lots and began excavation. A 
Township zoning officer issued Herr an enforcement notice 
because he believed that Herr had violated the Township's 
1992 zoning ordinance for excavation without a zoning 
permit and advertising the sale of the premises without a 
zoning permit. Herr appealed the enforcement notice to the 
Zoning Hearing Board ("ZHB"), arguing that the Township's 
1980 zoning ordinance applied rather than the 1992 zoning 
ordinance. The ZHB held that, even if Herr's substantive 
rights were determined by the earlier zoning ordinance, he 
must comply with the procedural requirements of the new 
ordinance, including its permit requirements. Herr appealed 
to the Court of Common Pleas. 
 
The appeals to the Court of Common Pleas were 
consolidated. On December 29, 1999, the Court decided in 
favor of Herr and against the Township. With regard to the 
issues raised by the Township, the Court held that the 
LCPC did not abuse its discretion in granting Herr an 
extension and allowing recordation of his plan. With regard 
to the issue raised by Herr, the Court found that the 1992 
zoning ordinance requiring a permit for excavation and 
advertising was inapplicable because it was substantive 
rather than procedural in nature and thus adversely and 
improperly affected Herr's substantive rights. The Township 
appealed the Court of Common Pleas decision to the 





We agree with the District Court that Herr had a property 
interest in Millwood which was entitled to protection under 
"the substantive due process element of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Herr v. Pequea Township, No. 99-cv-199, at 
17 (E.D. Pa. filed July 31, 2000). See Blanche Road, 57 
F.3d at 268 n.15; DeBlasio, 53 F.3d at 601. We thus turn 
to the issue of whether Herr was deprived of that property 




With possible exceptions hereafter addressed in section 
IV, the injuries for which Herr seeks redress arise from the 
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delay occasioned by the proceedings before the LCPC, the 
DER, the EHB, the ZHB and the courts of Pennsylvania. 
When recovery is sought against a participant in 
adjudicatory proceedings before state agencies and state 
courts based on its participation in those proceedings, 
fundamental interests are implicated that were not 
implicated in the situations before us in Bello  and its 
progeny. Both the Constitution and the common law 
provide protection for those who petition the government. 
 
"[T]he [First Amendment] right to petition extends to all 
departments of government" including administrative 
agencies and the courts. California Motor Transport Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). It is made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
The protection it affords thus applies both to petitioning 
state agencies and to petitioning state courts. Moreover, 
this protection extends not only to petitioning for 
affirmative relief but also to petitioning in opposition to 
applications for relief by others. Armstrong Surgical Center, 
Inc. v. Armstrong County Mem. Hosp., 185 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 
1999) (holding that the First Amendment right to petition 
provides protection for opposition to a competitor's 
application to the State Department of Health for a 
Certificate of Necessity for a medical facility). 
 
While the right to petition conferred by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments does not provide an absolute 
immunity from liability for actions based on petitioning 
activity, see California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 513-14, 
the Supreme Court has held that such liability cannot be 
imposed in the absence of a finding that the position taken 
lacked any reasonable basis. In Professional Real Estate 
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. , 508 U.S. 49 
(1993), Columbia Pictures sued Professional Real Estate 
Investors ("PRE") for copyright infringement. PRE filed a 
counterclaim under the Sherman Act and various state 
laws charging that the copyright infringement suit was a 
part of a conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade. 
When Columbia Pictures moved for summary judgment 
based on its constitutionally protected right to petition, PRE 
argued that the copyright suit had been instituted in bad 
 
                                11 
 
 
faith, i.e., it was brought to restrain trade and without an 
"honest . . . beli[ef] that the infringement claim was 
meritorious." Id. at 54. The Supreme Court acknowledged 
that petitioning immunity did not extend to liability based 
on the institution or maintenance of "sham" litigation but 
held that litigation could be regarded as a "sham" only if it 
is "objectively baseless." 
 
        We now outline a two-part definition of "sham" 
       litigation. First, the lawsuit must be objectively 
       baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
       realistically expect success on the merits. If an 
       objective litigant could conclude that the suit is 
       reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the 
       suit is immunized . . . , and an antitrust claim 
       premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if 
       challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a 
       court examine the litigant's subjective motivation. 
       Under this second part of our definition of sham, the 
       court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit 
       conceals "an attempt to interfere directly  with the 
       business relationships of a competitor," through the 
       "use [of] the governmental process-- as opposed to the 
       outcome of that process -- as an anticompetitive 
       weapon," Omni, 499 U.S., at 380 (emphasis in original). 
 
Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60-61 
(citations omitted). 
 
The petitioning immunity that the Court upheld in PRE 
was immunity from antitrust liability. The Court pointed 
out, however, that the principles being relied upon were not 
limited to antitrust liability and noted that the same 
principles had been applied by it to liability under the 
National Labor Relations Act. See Bell Johnson's 
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (holding 
that for a civil suit to be enjoined, there must be both an 
improper motive on the part of the plaintiff and a lack of a 
reasonable basis for the suit). Moreover, the Supreme Court 
in PRE stressed that its holding was consistent with the 
protection traditionally afforded petitioning activity under 
the common law: 
 
       [T]he Court of Appeals correctly held that sham 
       litigation must constitute the pursuit of claims so 
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       baseless that no reasonable litigant could realistically 
       expect to secure favorable relief. 
 
        The existence of probable cause to institute legal 
       proceedings precludes a finding that an antitrust 
       defendant has engaged in sham litigation. The notion 
       of probable cause, as understood and applied in the 
       common-law tort of wrongful civil proceedings, requires 
       the plaintiff to prove that the defendant lacked 
       probable cause to institute an unsuccessful civil 
       lawsuit and that the defendant pressed the action for 
       an improper, malicious purpose. Probable cause to 
       institute civil proceedings requires no more than a 
       "reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a] 
       claim may be held valid upon adjudication." Because 
       the absence of probable cause is an essential element 
       of the tort, the existence of probable cause is an 
       absolute defense. Just as evidence of anticompetitive 
       intent cannot affect the objective prong of [the] sham 
       exception, a showing of malice alone will neither entitle 
       the wrongful civil proceedings plaintiff to prevail nor 
       permit the factfinder to infer the absence of probable 
       cause. 
 
Professional Real Estate Investors, 408 U.S. at 62-63 
(footnote and citations omitted). 
 
The law applied in PRE is generally referred to in the case 
law as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.6 Since PRE, the 
courts of appeals have frequently held that the restrictions 
on liability there recognized are applicable to liability under 
state tort laws, e.g., State of Missouri v. National 
Organization of Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1318-19 (8th Cir. 
1980), and to liability under the Civil Rights Act, e.g., 
Video Intern Productions, Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable 
Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(". . . we hold that any behavior by a private party that is 
protected from anti-trust liability by the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine is also outside to scope of S 1983 liability"); 
Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 614-15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. From the seminal cases of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers 
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
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(8th Cir. 1980) (same); Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 
547 F.2d 1329, 1342-46 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 
We reached a similar conclusion in Brownsville Golden 
Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155, 159-60 (3d 
Cir. 1988). There, two private individuals and a public 
official were charged with having conspired to mount a 
campaign to get the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to 
revoke the license of the plaintiff nursing home. This 
conspiracy was alleged to have violated state tort law. In 
support of its case, the plaintiff submitted a "smoking gun" 
letter written by a member of the official's staff arguably 
reflecting an agreement to work together to secure 
termination of the license. We made the following 
observations that are instructive here: 
 
       In a somewhat analogous situation, it has been held 
       that persons who were successful in persuading the 
       Forest Service to reduce or abandon its timber sales 
       program to protect the wilderness quality of an area 
       could not be liable under state tort law for interference 
       with an advantageous relationship. Sierra Club v. Butz, 
       349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Judge Zirpoli based 
       the decision on the First Amendment right to seek to 
       influence government action. 
 
        Two lines of cases support the Sierra Club  decision 
       and that which we uphold here: the defamation cases, 
       e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. 
       Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964), emphasizing the 
       constitutional importance of communication on 
       matters of public interest; and the Noerr-Pennington 
       cases teaching that the collusive use by competitors of 
       legislative, administrative or judicial process does not, 
       without more, give rise to an anti-trust violation, see, 
       e.g., Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
       365 U.S. 127, 81 S. Ct. 523, L.Ed. 2d 464 (1961); 
       California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited , 
       404 U.S. 508, 93 S. Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed 2d 642 (1972). 
 
        The rule that liability cannot be imposed for damage 
       caused by inducing legislative, administrative, or 
       judicial action is applicable here. The conduct on 
       which this suit is based is protected by the firmly 
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       rooted principle, endemic to a democratic government, 
       that enactment of and adherence to law is the 
       responsibility of all. 
 
Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 159-60 (footnote omitted). 
 
Also helpful is our decision in McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 
F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1992). There, a state employee, a prison 
counselor, allegedly prosecuted in bad faith a civil 
proceeding to have the plaintiff involuntarily committed to 
a mental health treatment facility. The plaintiff instituted 
his suit under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, 
claiming a violation of his right to substantive due process. 
We held that this claim was analogous to "a common law 
tort of malicious use of civil process by a state actor" and 
that "claims of malicious prosecution brought under 
Section 1983 `must include the elements of the common 
law tort as it has developed.' " Id. at 1088 (quoting Rose v. 
Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 1989)). We cited to 
section 674 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts  as 
evidencing those elements. That section provides: 
 
       One who takes an active part in the initiation, 
       continuation or procurement of civil proceedings 
       against another is subject to liability to the other for 
       wrongful civil proceedings if 
 
        (a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for 
       a purpose other than that of securing the proper 
       adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are 
       based, and 
 
        (b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings 
       have terminated in favor of the person against whom 
       they are brought. 
 
"In determining probable cause for initiation of civil 
proceedings, all that is necessary is that the claimant 
reasonably believe that there is a sound chance that his 
claim may be held legally valid upon adjudication." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, S 675, cmt. (e) (1976).7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, we do not read Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), a case dealing with an alleged malicious 
prosecution that implicated the Fourth Amendment, as overruling 
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Herr's S 1983 claim against the defendants in this case is 
analogous to the common law tort of malicious use of civil 
process by a state actor. Accordingly, liability cannot be 
imposed under the teaching of McArdle unless all elements 
of the common law tort are satisfied. This includes the 
requirement that the defendants resisted Herr's efforts to 
secure approval "without probable cause and primarily for 
a purpose other than securing the proper adjudication" of 
Herr's claim. Nor, of course, can liability be imposed in a 
manner inconsistent with the Constitution. 
 
As Justice Souter points out in his concurring opinion in 
PRE, there may be a conceptual difference between the 
Constitutional "probable cause" requirement as articulated 
in PRE and the term "probable cause" as employed by the 
Restatement and the common law. PRE, 508 U.S. at 66-67 
(Souter, J., concurring). PRE's "probable cause" is wholly 
objective -- liability may be imposed only if"no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect to secure favorable relief." 
PRE, 508 U.S. at 62. The common law's "probable cause" 
may have a subjective component -- the defendant must 
"reasonably believe that there is a sound chance that his 
claim may be held legally valid." Restatement (Second) of 
Torts S 675, cmt. (e). In most situations, this will be a 
distinction without a difference. If a person has undertaken 
to participate in civil proceedings and the circumstances 
are such that he could have a reasonable expectation that 
he may succeed, it will be the rare case indeed in which he 
does not actually have that expectation. In any event, we 
need not determine in this case whether there are cases in 
which the distinction would make a difference. It does not 
here. 
 
The record in this case will not support a conclusion that 
the defendants' resistance to Herr's application was 
frivolous in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
McArdle, a case dealing with an alleged malicious use of civil process 
that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Also, contrary to the 
suggestion of the dissent, we believe McArdle  stands for the proposition 
that the principles we endorsed in Brownsville  are applicable to an 
alleged constitutional tort based on substantive due process. 
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realistically expect to prevail. Nor will it support an 
inference that the defendants had no belief that they had a 
"sound chance" of prevailing. As the District Court pointed 
out, they took no appeal from the LCPC's original 
conditional approval in 1992 and thus did not contest that 
Herr was entitled for five years to the benefits of the prior 
zoning ordinance. Moreover, their basic position in the 
sewer litigation that Herr had no vested rights to municipal 
sewer services under the 1971 sewage facilities plan was 
ultimately sustained by the Commonwealth Court. Thus, 
what Herr characterizes as a bad faith "end run" around 
the grandfathering provision of the zoning law was, in 
reality, a winning argument. Even Herr's "smoking gun" 
letter, to the extent it can be taken as reflecting the 
defendants' views, evidences that the Township expected 
that it might well prevail before the DER and that the 
possibility of the five year period expiring was regarded as 
only an additional, incidental benefit of the defendants' 
resistance before the state agency and the courts. 
 
While Herr characterizes the defendants' resistance in 
conclusory terms as frivolous, he has not identified any 
specific issue and articulated why it was not a litigable one. 
Our search of the record has not identified such an issue, 
and we find no suggestion in the opinions of the decision- 
making agencies that any of them regarded the Township's 
positions as frivolous. Both the 1998 opinion of the 
Commonwealth Court in the sewer litigation and the 1999 
opinion of the Court of Common Pleas in the ensuing 
litigation analyze the issues presented with care and some 
detail. If either court had viewed one or more of those 
issues as frivolous, we are confident that some evidence of 
that view would have found its way into the opinions.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We fail to perceive any similarity between this case and Grant v. City 
of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996). There we were asked to decide 
"whether, in applying Harlow's objective test for qualified immunity, a 
Court may `consider' evidence of a defendant's state of mind when 
motivation is an essential element of the civil rights claim." Id. at 123. 
Our answer was in the affirmative. That answer is not helpful here, 
however. Because the positions taken by the Township have not been 
shown to be "objectively baseless" or asserted without "probable cause," 
the motive behind taking those positions is not legally relevant to the 
propriety of the summary judgment entered against Herr. 
 





To the extent the rule of decision here is grounded in the 
common law, it makes no difference whether we are 
analyzing the liability of the Township or the liability of the 
supervisors in their individual capacities. The elements of 
Herr's claim would be the same in either event, and if Herr 
has not come forward with evidence that satisfies each 
essential element of the analogous state tort, summary 
judgment is appropriate. To the extent the rule of decision 
here is an immunity rooted in the First Amendment, the 
analysis of the Township's liability involves an additional 
issue. It is clear that public officials sued in their individual 
capacity are entitled to the immunity provided under the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See Brownsville Golden Age 
Nursing Home, 839 F.2d at 159-60. We have found no case 
addressing the issue of whether a municipal corporation is 
entitled to such immunity.9 We predict, however, that the 
Supreme Court would hold that it is. 
 
In situations of this kind, a township and its supervisors 
represent their constituents and facilitate their 
participation in the governmental process. Indeed, if 
municipal governments are discouraged from utilizing 
municipal funds to finance participation in proceedings 
before other governmental agencies, their citizens are likely 
to be left without a voice in important matters pending 
before those agencies. Moreover, municipal governments 
are among those most likely to be in possession of 
information relevant to the kinds of decisions that had to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The dissent cites one case, Video International Production, Inc. v. 
Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1988), 
as standing for the proposition that petitioning immunity cannot apply 
to a public entity. In that case, however, the plaintiff did not seek to 
impose liability on the defendant city based on petitioning activity. The 
complaint was based on the city's own zoning enforcement decisions 
and, as the Court noted, "it is impossible for the government to petition 
itself." Id. at 1086. Video International did not involve a situation, 
like the 
one before us, in which the plaintiff seeks to impose liability on a 
municipality for petitioning a distinct public entity authorized by state 
law to resolve land planning issues. Video International would be of help 
here only if Herr were suing a public entity which had denied it a permit 
for reasons unrelated to the merits of the permit application. 
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be made here and are among those most likely to be aware 
of the decision makers' need for information. A rule which 
would discourage municipalities from expressing concerns 
and taking a position before other governmental agencies 
would "deprive the government of a valuable source of 
information." Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139. Granting petitioning 
immunity to townships would thus serve the purposes of 
the right to petition clause. While the Supreme Court has 
held that townships are not entitled to the across-the- 
board, common law, qualified immunity enjoyed by public 
officials who exercise discretionary functions, Owen v. City 
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649-50 (1980), the rationale 
of that decision is inapposite here. Petitioning immunity is 
a limited immunity based on a specific provision of the 
Constitution itself and extending it to townships would not 
only be consistent with, but would further, the purposes of 
the right to petition clause. 
 
We therefore hold that neither the Township nor its 
supervisors may be held liable based on the delays 
occasioned by the proceedings before the LCPC and other 
public bodies in the absence of a showing, not made upon 
this record, that they lacked "probable cause" for the 




In addition to the claims predicated on the delays 
occasioned by the proceedings before the LCPC and other 
public bodies, Herr's brief makes the following allegations: 
 
        As in Blanche Road, there is substantial evidence 
       that defendants tried to delay or stop Mr. Herr's 
       development through "extra scrutiny" of Mr. Herr's 
       plans -- both improper reviews and never-ending 
       searches for "problems" with or additional conditions 
       for the plans. Additional "problems" or conditions, the 
       Township supposed, might cause the LCPC to 
       disapprove the project or Mr. Herr to abandon it. For 
       example, there is evidence that defendants caused the 
       Township zoning officer to give special attention to 
       reviews of plans for Millwood Industrial Park. Similarly, 
       there is evidence that the Township conducted 
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       numerous, time-consuming reviews to find "every 
       possible violation" in Mr. Herr's plans (Blanche Road, 
       57 F.3d at 260) and, thereafter, reported all such 
       reviews to the LCPC in the hope that the LCPC would 
       disapprove the plans. 
 
        Finally, there is evidence of the Township's and the 
       Supervisors' efforts to foster unfounded opposition to 
       Millwood Industrial Park from public agencies and 
       private parties alike. The Township repeatedly sent out 
       letters attempting to "engender any concerns" or 
       otherwise "get Mr. Herr on something else" (Blanche 
       Road, 57 F.3d at 258) as a means to "slow down and 
       shut down" (Id. at 260) the project. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 31-32. 
 
While these charges are cast in a somewhat different 
form and are obviously intended to bring these aspects of 
Herr's case within the teachings of Blanche Road , we 
conclude that they, too, are barred by the protection 
afforded for petitioning activity. To the extent these claims 
are based on communications to the LCPC and other 
responsible state agencies, a straightforward application of 
the principles already discussed leads to the conclusion 
that there can be no S 1983 liability. Calling concerns about 
a proposed development to the attention of the responsible 
state agencies lies at the core of privileged activity, and this 
is true without regard to the number of concerns expressed 
so long as there is some rational basis for those concerns. 
In making these charges, Herr has identified no problem 
communicated to a state agency that has been shown to 
have no rational basis. 
 
In Blanche Road, we held that the defendants might have 
exposed themselves to S 1983 liability "by ordering that 
Blanche Road's applications be reviewed with greater 
scrutiny in order to slow down the development." 57 F.3d 
at 269. We so held, however, in the context of a situation 
in which the defendants comprised the permitting authority 
and their alleged conduct "improperly interfered with the 
process by which the township issued permits . . . for 
reasons unrelated to the merits of the application for 
permits." Blanche Road, 57 F.3d at 267-68. 
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Here, the charge is that the defendants instructed 
Township employees to apply "extra scrutiny" in their 
review of Herr's proposal in order to identify problems 
relevant to Herr's application before the LCPC and other 
state agencies. We conclude that this essential precursor to 
the Township's actual communications with the state 
agencies also comes within the law's protection for 
petitioning activity and that this is true regardless of how 
thorough the employees were instructed to be in identifying 




The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I must dissent from the majority's opinion, because I 
would hold that there exists a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Pequea Township's actions violated Herr's 
substantive due process rights and, therefore, I would 
remand for trial. I part company from the majority, which 
holds that the 1st Amendment right to petition permits the 
Township to use litigation and the judicial process in order 
to prevent Herr from developing his property. For the 
following reasons, in my opinion, the majority has erred: 
 
1. Many of the actions taken by Pequea Township, 
which deliberately delayed and obstructed Herr in the 
development of his property, were actions which arose from 
other than Court proceedings and the judicial process, and 
thus may not be considered within the rubric of the 
Township's right to petition under the 1st Amendment. In 
short -- Herr's evidence in support of this substantive due 
process claim is not simply limited to the Township's 
litigious behavior. 
 
2. Pequea itself has rejected any claim or theory 
dependent upon the right to petition. In short -- Pequea 
has declined to rely on any such theory even after it was 
encouraged to do so. 
 
3. Even if a right to petition were relevant in this case 
(as the majority believes it to be), it cannot defeat or 
overcome an individual's substantive due process right 
where the Township of Pequea has engaged in arbitrary and 
capricious developmental conduct. In short -- the improper 
motives of the Township cannot be immunized by resorting 
to a right to petition theory and the majority has cited 
to no authority which would support such aberrant 
jurisprudence. 
 
        a. In an effort to bolster its conclusion that Herr's 
       action is barred by Pequea Township's right to petition 
       -- a theory to which not even Pequea itself has 
       subscribed -- the majority claims that the Noerr- 
       Pennington doctrine supports its thesis.1 But Noerr- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Named after two Supreme Court cases, Eastern Railroad Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), Noerr-Pennington 
immunity protects private parties from antitrust liability flowing from 
valid petitioning activity to the government. 
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       Pennington immunity applies to private, not 
       governmental, entities, and as I have pointed out and 
       will amplify later in this dissent, Herr's charges 
       encompass more than just petitioning activity. In short 
       -- Noerr-Pennington immunity may not be looked to in 
       an effort to resolve this controversy. 
 
4. Of even greater significance, the majority has ignored, 
and has not even referred to, a Third Circuit opinion 
relevant here. Grant v. Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 
1996) holds, albeit in a qualified immunity context, that 
claims of substantive due process violations of the kind 
alleged by Herr require careful examination by the courts of 
the motive and intent of the relevant government entity 
involved. In short -- the majority's opinion would ignore 
Grant's teachings, and would preclude Herr's evidence of 
improper motive and intent on the basis of a right to 





It should be recalled that Herr is a landowner with 
property in Pequea Township. He submitted a plan for an 
industrial park to the Lancaster County Planning 
Commission ("LCPC"), which granted preliminary and final 
approval to his plan. According to the relevant Pequea 
Township ordinances, Herr's industrial park was to be 
provided with public sewer service. It was only after Herr 
received approval from the LCPC that the Township 
modified its ordinances and engaged in multiple court and 
other actions which the record reveals were designed to 
prevent the development of Herr's property in accordance 
with the industrial nature of the zoning approval. It did so 
because the Township desired the property to be used for 
agricultural purposes rather than the zoned industrial 
purposes. 
 
Herr, whose legal position to develop an industrial 
property was eventually upheld by the courts of 
Pennsylvania,2 faced roadblocks at every step of his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The majority provides that the Township's"basic position in the sewer 
litigation that Herr had no vested rights to municipal sewer services 
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attempts at industrial development for over eleven years. It 
was not just a case of litigating his rights (which he was 
forced to do), but it was a case where the Township, which 
had a very deliberate and intentional motive to prevent Herr 
from developing his property, obstructed Herr at every turn 
of the road. 
 
Both parties tried this case to summary judgment on the 
issue that Herr's substantive due process rights had been 
violated. Counsel for both parties rejected the majority's 
suggestion that McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083 (3d cir. 
1992), had anything to do with Herr's predicament. McArdle 
is a classic malicious abuse of prosecution case, whose 
viability is in substantial doubt after the Supreme Court 
decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). 
Moreover, neither counsel relied on any aspect of Pequea 
Township's 1st Amendment right to petition or the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine. Rather, both parties in this case 
approached the issue on appeal in a straight-forward 
manner -- the one asserting and the other denying a 
substantive due process violation. 
 
The plaintiff, Herr, contended that Pequea Township was 
motivated by a desire to retain his property as agricultural 
property. Herr, who had purchased the property and was 
"grandfathered" into the zoning of the property as industrial 
(so long as he developed the property within five years), 
claimed that Pequea Township's acts were taken in bad 
faith and with an improper motive, thus preventing him 
from developing his property. Pequea, on the other hand, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
under the 1971 sewage facilities plan was ultimately sustained by the 
Commonwealth Court," and therefore was a "winning argument." Maj. 
op. at 17. This reading by the majority, however, does not tell the whole 
story. In fact, the Commonwealth Court -- while disagreeing with the 
Environmental Hearing Board and ruling that the protection offered to a 
developer's approved plan under S 508 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities 
Planning Code did not apply to sewage facility plans-- nevertheless 
found the Board's error to be harmless and ruled in favor of Herr. See 
Pequea Township v. Herr, 716 A.2d 678, 684-85 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998). 
Indeed, the Commonwealth Court agreed that "Herr had established that 
[Pequea Township's] 1992 sewage plan was inadequate to meet Herr's 
sewage disposal needs," and upheld Herr's right to municipal sewage 
services from Pequea. Id. at 685. 
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argued that motive was not an issue, and that if it had 
been, their motives were proper. 
 
I suggest that this is the issue that must be resolved, not 
the issues manufactured by the majority on which they 




We have held that "non-legislative state action," which is 
the type of state action at issue here, "may . . . give rise to 
a substantive due process claim upon allegations that the 
government deliberately and arbitrarily abused its power." 
Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University, 227 F.3d 133, 
139 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). A 
substantive due process claim arising out of non-legislative 
state action has two elements: 1) "we must look, as a 
threshold matter, to whether the property interest being 
deprived is `fundamental' under the Constitution," Nicholas, 
227 F.3d at 142; and 2) the plaintiff "also must 
demonstrate that [he] was the victim of `a governmental 
action [that] was arbitrary, irrational, or tainted by 
improper motive.' " Woodwind Estates, Ltd. v. Gretowski, 
205 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2000). Grant v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 93 F.3d 116, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1996) adds that a 
court is to consider evidence of a defendant's state of mind 
[here, Pequea's] when motivation is an essential element [as 




There can be no doubt that the property interest at issue 
here is "fundamental." "Indeed," as we held in DeBlasio v. 
Zoning Board of Adjustment for the Township of West 
Amwell, "one would be hard-pressed to find a property 
interest more worthy of substantive due process protection 
than ownership." 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Accordingly, I believe, and the majority agrees as well, see 
maj. op at 10, that the District Court properly held that 
Herr's interest in developing his property was an interest 
worthy of due process protection. 
 





Because Herr has alleged a violation of a fundamental 
property interest, it must be determined whether Herr has 
suffered from "a governmental action [that] was arbitrary, 
irrational, or tainted by improper motive." Bello v. Walker, 
840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir.1988). We have made clear 
that, "[i]n disputed factual situations, the determination of 
the existence of improper motive or bad faith is properly 
made by the jury as the finder of fact." Woodwind Estates, 
Ltd. v. Gretowski, 205 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2000). We 
also observed in Woodwind that "we have not hesitated to 
vacate a grant of summary judgment or a judgment as a 
matter of law where the evidence at least plausibly showed 
that the government took actions against the developer for 
indefensible reasons unrelated to the merits of the zoning 
dispute." 205 F.3d at 124. In this context, "the intentional 
blocking or delaying of the issuance of permits for reasons 
unrelated to the merits of the permit application violates 
principles of substantive due process and is actionable 
under S [1]983." Woodwind, 205 F.3d at 124-25. 
 
Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to Herr, 
because it was Pequea Township, the defendant, which had 
moved for summary judgment, I believe that a rational jury 
could and would certainly find that the Township 
intentionally blocked or delayed Herr's development of his 
property "for reasons unrelated to the merits" of his 
development plan. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the 
Township used every effort -- including access to the courts 
-- to hinder development of Herr's land. 
 
There is extensive evidence from which a jury could find 
that the Township acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or with 
improper motive. Alan S. Peterson ("Peterson"), Chairman of 
the Pequea Township Environmental Advisory Council, sent 
numerous letters in 1990 to such places as the Nature 
Conservancy, the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission, the Pennsylvania Game Commission, and the 
Pennsylvania Fish Commission, asking them to review 
Herr's proposal "for possible endangered species or other 
environmental rarities," "for possible historical or 
archaeological significance," and "for . . . species of special 
concern." (App. 612a-615a.) Peterson also sent another 
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round of letters in early 1992 to the Lancaster Water 
Authority, the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, the 
Suburban Lancaster Sewer Authority, and Department of 
Transportation, among others, informing them about 
concerns related to Herr's proposal. (App. 616a-622a.) 
Additionally, Virginia K. Brady ("Brady"), a member of the 
Township Board of Supervisors and a defendant in this 
action, sent similar letters in October 1993 to the 
Department of Transportation, the Bureau of Dams and 
Waterways, the Department of the Army, and the Lancaster 
City Engineer in October 1993. (App. 638a-641a.) 
 
Peterson sent a letter to Eugene Dice, an attorney, 
stating: 
 
       Only Virginia Brady and I in the township know the 
       following: (Do not state this back to the township in 
       any manner). The owner must sell the lots, then all the 
       land development plans must be approved by 10/94 or 
       they become nonconforming lots in the Ag. District. 
       Obviously the longer we can stall (if we can't win this 
       with DER), the better. . . . We want this defeated after 
       our four year struggle! 
 
(App. 374a-375a (emphasis added).) 
 
Brady stated at her deposition: "Development is not bad. 
However, to put -- and this is a personal opinion-- to put 
development on prime agricultural soils is not right, and 
that is a personal belief I have had for many, many, many 
years." (App. 216a.). Additionally, Brady was quoted in a 
1997 newspaper article, regarding the "battle" between Herr 
and Pequea Township over his development plan, as 
stating: "We already have an industrial park," and "I am 
opposed to paving over any prime agricultural land." (App. 
585a-586a.) Bruce Groff, another member of the Board of 
Supervisors and a defendant in this action, was quoted as 
saying that "support [for rural preservation] is desperately 
needed to deter recent and future horrendous proposals 
being prepared by developers." (App. 379a.) 
 
Herr received a letter in April 1999 from Robert G. 
Sneath, whose company had been a potential buyer of 
space at Herr's proposed industrial park, in which Mr. 
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Sneath requested that Herr release him from the agreement 
of sale, explaining: 
 
       My Associate, Glenn Warfel, talked to the zoning officer 
       about our plans. His name is Wes Brocknoe. . . Glenn 
       was informed that your plans were under litigation and 
       the land was still zoned agricultural by Pequea 
       Township. The zoning officer was not at liberty to talk 
       about it. With timing important to us, this was not 
       encouraging. 
 
(App. 210a.) Mr. Sneath also stated, "Quite frankly, 
everything I have heard about dealing with Pequea 
Township is negative. I have no desire to invest my money 
in a township with a negative attitude. It looks like this 
development could take forever to be approved by the 
township." (App. 210a.) 
 
In light of this evidence, it is clear to me that the issue 
of whether the Township had an improper motive must be 
sent to the jury. Indeed, it is inconceivable to me how the 
District Court could have held otherwise. The District Court 
analyzed the evidence without regard to the fact that the 
issue of improper motive was before the court on a 
summary judgment motion, in which the court was required 
to draw all reasonable inferences in Herr's favor. Instead, 
the District Court several times drew inferences in Pequea 
Township's favor in direct contravention of the summary 
judgment standard. 
 
For instance, the District Court drew the following 
conclusions from the evidence: 1) "the reasonable inference 
to be drawn is that Defendants wished to zone [another 
land parcel which was permitted to remain industrial] 
consistently with its current use, rather than carry out the 
pointless exercise of changing the zoning to agricultural but 
grandfathering the preexisting industrial use"; 2) "there is 
no evidence before us that Defendants knew they could not 
stop development of Millwood Park, yet acted merely to 
delay and harass Plaintiff "; 3) "the mere fact that Dr. 
Peterson claims that Virginia Brady was aware of the time 
limit imposed by [the grandfather clause under which 
Herr's land was zoned industrial] does not imply an 
improper motive on her part"; 4) there was "no basis for an 
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inference that Defendants pursued the sewer litigation for 
any purpose other than a genuine desire not to have 
Millwood Park come about in the form proposed by 
Plaintiff "; and 5) "[t]here is no basis to determine what the 
true motives [of the Township] were." (App. 21a-25a.) 
 
Additionally, I should note that a motive on the part of 
the Township to prevent industrialization of land, i.e., "not 
to have Millwood Park come about in the form proposed by 
Plaintiff," (App. 25a), is not related to the merits of the 
zoning dispute between Herr and the Township. Herr had 
already submitted his plan to a separate governmental 
entity (the LCPC), which approved Herr's plan before the 
Township could pass legislation which would prevent the 
proposed development. The fact that the Township properly 
enacted new zoning and sewage ordinances with the goal of 
reducing development does not mean that its actions to 
attempt to defeat a development plan that had legitimately 
escaped its regulation were proper. Indeed, in my view, the 
Township's motive in enacting new ordinances and plans 
relating to land use is irrelevant, and the District Court 




The majority holds that the Township's litigation-related 
actions are protected by the 1st Amendment right to 
petition and that, therefore, they cannot form the basis of 
Herr's substantive due process claim. Holding that Herr 
could not prove any injury without these actions, the 
majority affirms the District Court's summary judgment 
dismissal of Herr's substantive due process claim. I cannot 
agree with this holding because the right to petition does 
not bar substantive due process liability for litigation 
arbitrarily and irrationally initiated by a governmental 
entity. 
 
A. Pequea's Actions Other and Apart from Litigation 
 
As an initial matter, Herr's evidence in support of his 
substantive due process claim is not simply limited to the 
Township's litigious behavior. Herr presents evidence of a 
litany of conduct by the Township above and beyond its 
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litigation activity over a span of eleven years-- all of which 
was purportedly designed to delay and block the industrial 
development of Herr's land. 
 
This evidence includes: (1) proof of the Township's 
campaign since 1990 to find problems with, or raise 
unfounded concerns about, Millwood Industrial Park with 
the hope that the problems raised would lead to delays 
leading past the five-year grandfather period; (2) proof of 
the Township's "extra scruntiny" of Herr's applications in 
an effort to delay the development past the five-year period; 
(3) proof of the Township's denial of Herr's applications for 
public sewer service motivated by reasons unrelated to 
water-quality issue but rather by Pequea's desire to hold up 
Herr's development; and (4) proof that the Township's 
issuance of an enforcement notice was part of a campaign 
to delay development. This conduct has nothing to do with 
litigation or petitioning activity before the LCPC or state 
courts, and therefore -- even assuming the majority's right 
to petition is correct -- it would not be immunized by the 
1st Amendment. 
 
B. Counsel's Rejection of Pequea's Petitioning Right 
 
Next, Pequea Township itself has rejected any claim or 
theory dependent upon the right to petition, declining to 
rely on any such theory even after it was encouraged to do 
so. Not only was this theory never raised, entertained or 
discussed by the very party to whose benefit it would 
redound, but when asked for supplemental memoranda 
pertaining to that issue, both Herr and Pequea declined to 
embrace or rely on such a theory. They did so because both 
parties recognized that this case was a garden variety 
substantive due process proceeding. 
 
Likewise, the majority's reliance upon McArdle v. Tronetti, 
961 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1992) -- which it urged upon the 
parties -- is inapposite. There, we analyzed the plaintiff 's 
S 1983 claim as a malicious use of civil process claim in 
violation of his 14th Amendment rights. Referring to Lee v. 
Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1988), and its progeny, we 
reasoned that "a claim of malicious use of process may 
state a S 1983 claim if it includes the elements of that 
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common law tort as it has developed." McArdle , 961 F.2d at 
1088. Accordingly, we required that such a claim requires 
proof that (1) the defendant "acted in a grossly negligent 
manner or without probable clause and primarily for a 
purpose other than that of securing the proper . . . 
adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are 
based; and (2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of 
the person against whom they are brought." Id. 
 
Setting aside the issue of McArdle's questionable viability 
after the Supreme Court decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 
U.S. 266 (1994),3 the majority, by claiming that "Herr's 
S 1983 claim against the defendants in this case is 
analogous to the common law tort of malicious use of civil 
process by a state actor," see maj. op. at 16, again directly 
contradicts the repeated and equivocal positions of both 
Herr's and the Township's counsel that Herr's claims were 
not malicious use of process claims. Indeed, in a 
Supplemental Letter Brief dated June 1, 2000 (ordered by 
this Court), the Township specifically conceded that: 
 
       the McArdle principles do not apply to the instant 
       appeal. . . . Because the issues regarding abuse of 
       process have not been raised by [Herr] in the instant 
       appeal and because [Herr] has not produced evidence 
       to allow a finding of abuse of process, [the Township] 
       argues that McArdle has no relevance to the instant 
       appeal. . . . [T]he principles of McArdle  have no 
       determinative effect on this Honorable Court's ability to 
       decide that there is insufficient evidence of record to 
       support a reasonable jury finding of a substantive due 
       process violation. 
 
Similarly, Herr agrees that his claims are not malicious use 
of process claims. While I acknowledge that we should 
recognize the correct jurisprudence even if counsel declines 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Supreme Court's holding in Albright  -- which suggested that a 
malicious prosecution claim must be anchored in explicit constitutional 
text, such as the Fourth Amendment, rather than generalized notions of 
due process -- has cast doubt on the viability of Lee v. Mihalich and its 
progeny, including McArdle. See,e.g., Gallo v. City of Philadelphia,161 
F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[Albright] has created great uncertainty in 
the law" of malicious prosecution under S 1983 and Bivens). 
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to do so, we should not, as the majority has done here, 
devise our own theory of liability (or immunity) after 
counsel has deliberately rejected that theory, particularly 
since it is flawed and lacks support in our jurisprudence. 
Indeed, I think it is inappropriate and improvident to 
substitute a panel's theory for counsel's, particularly when 
it is obvious from our own jurisprudence that the issue of 
improper motive in a substantive due process case is one 
for the jury and not for the judge. See Woodwind , 205 F.3d 
at 124; Grant, 93 F.3d at 124-25. 
 
Nevertheless, even if McArdle were applicable, Herr's 
claims (as discussed previously) encompass more than just 
abuse of process. Rather, his claims are based upon 
specific evidence showing that the Township blocked and 
delayed the industrial development of his land at every 
possible turn. The use of the court system is just one, 
albeit important, evidentiary example of the Township's 
tactics. Accordingly, the holding in McArdle -- even if 
applicable -- is too circumspect to be of value as to Herr's 
claims of substantive due process. 
 
C. A Right to Petition Cannot Trump Illegal Municipal 
Actions and Cannot Defeat a Legitimate Substantive Due 
Process Claim 
 
Even if a right to petition were relevant in this case, it 
cannot defeat or overcome an individual's substantive due 
process right where evidence has been presented that the 
Township of Pequea has engaged in arbitrary and 
capricious behavior. The improper motives of the Township 
cannot be immunized by resorting to a right to petition and 
the majority has cited to no authority which would support 
such aberrant jurisdiction. 
 
Though it is true that the First Amendment encompasses 
a right to petition, this right is "not absolute." San Filippo 
v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 435 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Additionally, the doctrine of substantive due process does 
not require that the actions taken by the government be 
illegal to constitute a due process violation. Instead, 
substantive due process "protects individual liberty against 
`certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
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procedures used to implement them.' " Collins v. Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. at 125 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 
U.S. 327, 331 (1986)) (emphasis added). Indeed, courts 
have repeatedly explained that substantive due process 
protects against "the arbitrary exercise of the powers of 
government." Bello v. Walker, 840 F.3d 1124, 1128 (3d Cir. 
1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Implicit in this 
statement is that the actions that form the basis of 
substantive due process claims are actions that are within 
the government's power but nevertheless may be 
constitutional violations in a particular case because of the 
government's motive in exercising that power. 
 
Accordingly, because of this clear indication in 
substantive due process jurisprudence that it is not the 
government's legal authority to exercise its power but its 
motive that is relevant in analyzing a substantive due 
process claim, I cannot agree with the majority's holding 
that the Township did not violate Herr's substantive due 
process rights simply because its actions were protected by 
the right to petition. 
 
By immunizing motive and intent whenever there is 
petitioning activity on the part of the government, the 
majority effectively renders the 14th Amendment powerless, 
turning it into mere surplusage any time improper litigious 
activity by a municipality is asserted. This "would 
essentially insulate government officials from liability for the 
very harm our substantive due process precedents have 
sought to redress: using government authority to take 
actions that, because of the improper motives of public 
officials, have no rational relationship to a legitimate 
government purpose." Grant, 98 F.3d at 125 (emphasis 
added). 
 
In this way, the right to petition -- which, by the 
majority's reasoning, virtually always defeats any evidence 
of a substantive due process violation -- would insulate the 
Township from the very arbitrary and capricious 
governmental conduct that is meant to be protected by the 
14th Amendment. By this reasoning, the right to petition 
would also immunize a municipality of liability under the 
Equal Protection Clause -- also a 14th Amendment claim 
-- notwithstanding evidence that a particular municipality 
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had pursued delay litigation tactics because of an 
individual's race or religious beliefs, just so long as it could 
articulate some non-frivolous justification to support its 
lawsuit. Such a result is clearly contrary to our 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
D. Noerr-Pennington is Not Applicable and Not Relevant 
to Government Misconduct 
 
In an effort to bolster its conclusion that Herr's due 
process claim is barred by the Township's right to petition, 
the majority claims that the Noerr-Pennington  doctrine 
supports its thesis. In our most recent exposition of the 
doctrine, we have described Noerr-Pennington immunity as 
follows: 
 
       Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, private parties 
       may be immunized against liability stemming from 
       antitrust injuries flowing from valid petitioning. This 
       includes two distinct types of actions. A petitioner may 
       be immune from the antitrust injuries which result 
       from the petitioning itself. Also . . . parties are immune 
       from liability arising from the antitrust injuries caused 
       by government action which results from petitioning. 
 
A.D. Bedell Wholesale Company, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 
263 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
"Rooted in the First Amendment and fears about the threat 
of liability chilling political speech," the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine generally insulates a private entity which petitions 
the government for redress from antitrust liability"even if 
there is an improper purpose or motive" behind the 
petitioning activity. Id. at 250 (emphasis added). We have 
also noted that "the immunity reaches not only to 
petitioning the legislative and executive branches of 
government, but `the right to petition extends to all 
departments of the Government,' including the judiciary." 
Id. (quoting California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)). 
 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and the rationale behind 
it, however, is not applicable here. First, in this case, it 
seeks to immunize too much. Because Herr's charges 
include more than appropriate petitioning activity on 
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Pequea's part (see Section III.A., supra ), the application of 
Noerr-Pennington here cannot insulate or immunize Pequea 
from Herr's claims. 
 
Second, and more importantly, however, Noerr-Pennington 
immunity applies to private parties -- not governmental 
entities -- seeking redress from the government. See Video 
International Production, Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable 
Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1082-84, 86 
(applying Noerr-Pennington protection to private cable 
operator against antitrust, tort and S 1983 co-conspirator 
liability, but noting as to municipal liability that"Noerr- 
Pennington protection does not apply to the government"); 
see also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Ind., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (protecting private 
movie companies against antitrust liability); Bill Johnson's 
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (extending 
1st Amendment protection to private employer who filed 
lawsuit against former employee allegedly in violation of the 
National Labor Relations Act); California Motor Transport 
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (refusing to 
apply 1st Amendment protections to private trucking 
company because it fell within "sham" exception); Gorman 
Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(immunizing private defendants against S 1983 liability on 
the basis of Noerr-Pennington protection, but holding public 
officials immune on grounds other than Noerr-Pennington 
immunity); State of Missouri v. National Organization for 
Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980) (protecting private 
women's organization against antitrust liability); Stern v. 
United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(protecting corporation and its officers againstS 1985 
liability). To the extent that the majority has cited one case 
that could arguably be seen as extending this immunity to 
a governmental entity, the protection immunized the party 
only against statutory liability, not against a constitutional 
deprivation. See Armstrong Surgical Center, Inc. v. 




4. In Armstrong, Noerr-Pennington protection was afforded to a hospital 
and its staff physicians from antitrust liability under the Sherman Act. 
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Accordingly, the application of the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine cannot resolve, and cannot be analogous to, the 
following conflict: whether a governmental entity's 
[Pequea's] 1st Amendment right to petition always trumps 
an individual citizen's [Herr's] 14th Amendment due 
process right to be free from arbitrary and capricious 
government activity.5 The majority provides no authority 
extending Noerr-Pennington to conduct by government 
entities which have been shown to have acted in violation 
of constitutional restrictions. Nor do I know of any 
authority purporting to extend Noerr-Pennington  in such a 
way so as to per se defeat an individual's constitutional 
rights under the 14th Amendment. 
 
One of the cases cited by the majority, Brownsville 
Golden Age Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wells, 839 F.2d 155 (3d 
Cir. 1988), involved a nursing home operator that filed state 
tort claims against two private individuals and a public 
official. There, the nursing home alleged that the 
defendants improperly scrutinized its operations through a 
publicity and letter-writing campaign which ultimately led 
to its loss of license. This Court affirmed the district court's 
grant of summary judgment against the nursing home 
because it failed to "raise a material issue of fact" on its 
state law claims of tortious interference with business 
relations and civil conspiracy. Id. at 159 (emphasis in 
original). Specifically, we agreed with the district court that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
While the caption of that case suggests that the hospital may have been 
a county hospital, the issue of whether it was a"municipality" or a 
"government entity" was never addressed. Indeed, the opinion itself 
appears to have referred to the defendant hospital as a "private party" a 
number of times, and explicitly characterized the Noerr-Pennington 
immunity as an "immunity for private parties." See, e.g., id. at 159-61, 
62 (emphasis added). 
 
5. It is axiomatic that government entities, unlike private citizens, are 
limited by the Constitution from certain conduct in ways that individuals 
are not (see, e.g., the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause). Therefore, providing a private citizen an absolute per se 
immunity arising from his or her 1st Amendment right to petition is far 
different than providing such an absolute constitutional right to a 
governmental entity such as Pequea Township. 
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the plaintiff failed to show that the defendants actions were 
"unlawful" or "improper" (as required by those torts) since 
the Pennsylvania courts had conclusively determined that 
the revocation of the home's license was warranted 
"because of its serious violations of nursing home 
standards." Id. 
 
Invoking, by analogy, the principles underlying 
defamation cases, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964), and Noerr-Pennington cases, we held that 
the defendants' actions "in calling [plaintiff 's] violations to 
the attention of state and federal authorities and eliciting 
public interest cannot serve as the basis of tort liability." 
Brownsville, 839 F.2d at 160. This ruling is a far cry from 
the situation in this case wherein Herr has presented 
credible evidence showing that the Township's motivations 
behind its delay tactics and in litigating the "sewer" issue 
were prompted by a desire to thwart Herr from his rightful 
claim to develop his property as well as a scheme to delay 
Herr sufficiently such that his five-year grandfather period 
would expire. In addition, unlike the allegations made in 
Brownsville, Herr's claims sound in direct constitutional 
authority and not in state common law or statutory 
liability. 
 
E. Grant v. Pittsburgh 
 
Finally, by disregarding evidence of the Township's 
motive and intent, the majority has ignored our holding in 
Grant v. Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996). There, 
Grant (a land developer) brought suit against certain city 
officials under S 1983 alleging, inter alia, violations of his 
substantive due process rights. In particular, Grant claimed 
that the nomination by city officials of two buildings for 
historic preservation under the Pittsburgh Historic 
Structures, District, Sites and Objects Ordinance, 
Pittsburg, Pa. Code Title 1007, S 513, effectively prevented 
the buildings from being demolished and thereby thwarted 
Grant's plans to develop the property on which the 
buildings were located. Grant alleged that the nomination 
was not motivated by public interest, but rather by partisan 
and personal politics having no bearing on the historic 
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preservation of the buildings. The defendants claimed 
qualified immunity. 
 
The district court, failing to consider each defendant's 
role individually in the alleged conduct, nonetheless denied 
the officials' summary judgment motion based upon 
qualified immunity. This Court remanded the qualified 
immunity issue for reevaluation as to the specific conduct 
of each defendant, but specifically noted that "courts are 
not barred from examining evidence of a defendant's state 
of mind in considering whether a plaintiff has adduced 
sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on the 
issue of qualified immunity, where such state of mind is an 
essential element of the constitutional violation itself." Id. at 
124 (citations omitted). In particular, our Court specifically 
recognized that, 
 
       [t]he substantive due process violation alleged in this 
       case is precisely the sort of claim where clearly 
       established law makes the conduct legal or illegal 
       depending upon the intent with which it is performed . 
       By their very nature, substantive due process claims of 
       this kind involve the application of otherwise legitimate 
       government machinery to achieve an illegitimate end.  
       . . . [W]hen the same officials invoke administrative 
       processes with an illicit purpose, they are violating 
       substantive due process guarantees and, at the same 
       time, `clearly established' law. 
 
Id. at 125 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although 
decided in the context of qualified immunity, Grant 
expressly recognizes and acknowledges that substantive 
due process claims often involve the use of legitimate 
governmental processes by government officials for 
illegitimate ends, and that the proper inquiry focuses not 
upon the propriety of the processes utilized, but rather 
upon the motives of the officials involved. 
 
Here, the very essence of Herr's substantive due process 
allegations depend upon the motives behind the actions 
taken by the Township and the individual defendants. As 
already discussed (see Section II.B., supra), Herr has 
presented particularized and specific evidence which-- if 
credited -- could reasonably lead a jury to conclude that 
 
                                38 
 
 
the actions by Pequea Township in this case were motivated 
by illicit purposes, and thereby violated Herr's substantive 




The District Court noted that "we believe Defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity." (App. 30a.) The Supreme 
Court stated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald: "government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). I would hold that the defendants 
here should have known that their actions may have 
violated Herr's substantive due process rights and, 
therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. 
However, because I am satisfied that the issue of"improper 
motive" must be returned for jury determination, even 
though I believe that the Township has violated Herr's 
constitutional right and that the right was clearly 
established at the time of the violation, I would hold that 
the qualified immunity issue should be addressed not by us 
but in the District Court. 
 
Such a holding would be consistent with our holdings in 
Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Township and Woodwind, 
both of which involved substantive due process challenges 
to governmental interference with land development plans. 
In Blanche Road, we stated: 
 
       In the instant case . . . , when the evidence is viewed 
       in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it is clear that 
       defendants could not have reasonably believed that 
       their conduct did not violate [plaintiffs']6 rights. If 
       defendants, for reasons unrelated to an appropriate 
       governmental purpose, intentionally conspired to 
       impede the development of the Blanche Road project, 
       by ordering that Blanche Road's applications be 
       reviewed with greater scrutiny in order to slow down 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 




                                39 
 
 
       the development and by ordering that efforts be taken 
       to shut down the development, such an arbitrary 
       abuse of governmental power would clearly exceed the 
       scope of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the defense of 
       qualified immunity is not available to defendants in the 
       instant matter. 
 
57 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 1995). Similarly, we held in 
Woodwind that: "In the instant case . . . , when the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it 
is clear that the supervisor defendants could not have 
reasonably believed that their conduct did not violate 
plaintiff 's rights." 205 F.3d at 125. 
 
I believe that the defendants in this case have even less 
claim to qualified immunity than the defendants in Blanche 
Road. If the right to be free from state intervention with 
land development was clearly established when Blanche 
Road was decided (in 1995), it is even more clearly 
established now in light of the Third Circuit's decision and 




I would reverse the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment to Pequea Township and remand the case for 
trial, because Herr has a fundamental property interest; 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 
Township acted with an improper motive; and the 
Township's delay tactics, including its initiation of 
litigation, is not protected from substantive due process 
analysis by any claimed right to petition. Because the 
majority of the panel holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
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